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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Analysis of the Moscow Statement of Communist Parties

I enclose, as of possible interest, an analysis which the Department has prepared concerning the cutcome of the recent Moscow conference of communist parties.

78/ CHRISTIAN A. HERTER

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
Enclosures

Analysis of Moscow Statement of Communist Parties.

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On December 6 the USSR and other communist sources made public a 20,000 world "Statement" approved at the conference of eighty-one communist parties which sat in Moscow for three weeks in November to consider Sino-Soviet differences over bloc foreign and domestic policies. Publication of a second document -- "an appeal to the peoples of the world" -- also adopted at the conference is expected momentarily.

The Statement is a long and complex document, from which formulations can be extracted to support divergent interpretations of probable future Soviet and Chinese Communist policy lines. It can be said at the outset, however, that: (a) it indicates the probability of the application of a more active and militant policy, by both the Soviets and the Chinese, in the underdeveloped world; and (b) it contains a number of danger signals which the West would do well to heed, such as a call for the "strengthening of the might and defense capacity of the entire socialist camp by every means."

In three respects the Statement confirms the obviously difficult nature of the conference which issued it. First, like the Bucharest conference last June, it reaffirms the adherence of the participants to the 1957 Moscow Declaration, the last extended policy statement issued by a multi-party conference, and on several contentious issues falls back on language included in the earlier document. Second, the Statement, which is much longer than the 1957 Declaration, is a mish-mash of Soviet and Chinese Communist phraseology, often mentioning a single subject in several different passages and in slightly contradictory language. Third, the Statement is vague enough or contradictory enough to permit the re-emergence of controversy and conflict on questions of policy and authority.

With regard to foreign policy, the Statement preserves largely intact the basic Soviet theses regarding the non-inevitability of war and the need for "coexistence" but sets them in a matrix of very considerable militancy. In

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its analysis of the non-communist world, the Statement devotes particular attention to opportunities for the expansion of anti-Westernism and communist influence in underdeveloped countries. It implies that Castro's Cuba is a good example of a "national democracy", a new bloc formulation for a desirable type of government, short of admitted communism, in such areas. It specifically mentions Laos and South Vietnam as other areas where "national democratic" movements are developing.

The Statement emphasizes what it claims as the decline in power and coherence of policy of the major capitalist powers, saying "the time is past when the imperialists could decide at will whether there should or should not be war". However, it also emphasizes the importance of further increase in bloc economic and military strength, which, it says, should "in the near future" make "the superiority of the forces of socialism and peace ... absolute". It takes a characteristically strong anti-American line, citing the United States as the backbone of world reaction, the principal defender of the collapsing colonial system and "the enemy of the peoples of the entire world", while also sharply attacking British, French and West German policy.

On foreign policy questions the Statement thus has a somewhat inconsistent character. It leaves open the question of whether the Soviet-inspired formulas regarding "coexistence" (though defined as a form of the class struggle) and the avoidance of war or the assertiveness of the execution of bloc policy implied by the militant language used on other matters (reflecting Chinese Communist pressure in this direction) will turn out to be the more important.

On matters relating to intra-bloc and intra-communist party relations, the Statement is equally ambiguous. Like the 1957 Declaration it refers to "revisionism" (of which the Chinese have implied the Soviets were guilty) as the "main danger" but expands the discussion of the evil of "dogmatism" (of which the Soviets have charged the Chinese).

The document sheds little light on the question of the level of Soviet economic and military assistance to Communist China. In its extended discussion of the importance of mutual aid among socialist countries and of the importance of Soviet aid in particular, and in its remarks regarding

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the importance of building up the military strength of the entire bloc, the Statement may reflect discussion at the meeting of a sort making it hard for the Soviet Union not to maintain Soviet assistance to Communist China at its pre-dispute level, restoring any cuts made last summer.

The most obvious result of the conference itself is the fact that the Soviets and Chinese Communists agree on the necessity of maintaining a display of unity; the Statement issued will probably serve for the immediate future at least as a basis for a continuing manifestation of harmony. Nevertheless, there is every evidence -- both from the Statement itself and from accounts of the conference proceedings -- that basic Sino-Soviet differences remain unresolved and will crop up again in the future. Indeed, the reported acrimonious exchanges between the Soviets and Chinese might well have the effect over the longer run of solidifying these differences.

Perhaps the most significant feature of the conference is the large measure of success which the Chinese Communists apparently had in challenging Soviet leadership of world communism. The conference had been preceded by four months of intensive efforts on Moscow's part to bring the Chinese around to its point of view. The ambivalent language of the Statement reflects the extent to which these Soviet efforts failed. To get even this much, Moscow required three weeks of lengthy and free-wheeling debate, during which the Chinese reportedly openly expounded their contrary views. At least two bloc parties, and an as yet indeterminate number of nonbloc parties, supported Communist China's position against the Soviet Union. It may be of interest to note that among the nonbloc parties support for Communist China appears to have come from underdeveloped and less stable areas of Latin America and Asia while support for the Soviet Union came primarily from the better established and more generally prosperous countries of Europe.

The Statement contains a strong reaffirmation of the primacy of the Soviet party in world communism. Perhaps more important, however, is its insistence upon the equality and independence of all parties and its unique assertion that world communist policies and decisions, which must be binding upon "every party", will be collectively determined, thereby undermining Moscow's pretensions to call the tune.



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While the Statement does not necessarily reflect the policies which the USSR will in fact follow, taken at face value it represents a clear call for continuation and intensification of the cold war.

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